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The Shinto Cases: Religion, Culture, or Both—The
Japanese Supreme Court and Establishment of
Religion Jurisprudence
Frank S. Ravitch*
I. INTRODUCTION
Japanese “Establishment Clause” law, cases under Article 20 and
1
Article 89 of the Japanese Constitution, is heavily based on
situations involving Shinto shrines or Shinto rituals. For a number of
historical, theological, and cultural reasons, discussed in greater
2
detail in Part II, this should not be surprising. The history and
evolution of this area of jurisprudence from the Meiji era to the most
recent cases creates a fascinating legal and cultural journey.
There is a tendency to consider the “Shinto cases” as a single line
of cases that are at the core of Japanese Establishment of Religion
jurisprudence. This Article suggests that it is certainly correct to
view these cases as a core of Japanese Establishment of Religion
jurisprudence, but they are not a “line” of case law. Rather, they
represent two loosely connected lines of cases and one era that
involved state establishment. Thus, the cases fall into a history of
three relatively distinct legal eras. First, the pre-war establishment of
State Shinto. Second, the post-war Shinto as Culture cases. Third,
3
what I will call the post Ehime Tamagushi era, or what some might
call the modern era of Shinto cases. The most recent of these cases
4
was decided in early 2012.

* Professor of Law, Walter H. Stowers Chair in Law and Religion and Director of the
Kyoto, Japan Summer Program, Michigan State University College of Law. I would like to thank
Cole Durham, Brett Scharffs, and the BYU Law and Religion Center for sponsoring this
wonderful symposium and for inviting me to speak on this fascinating topic. I also thank Tasuku
Matsuo for his excellent presentation and for sharing some of his great experience and wisdom
with me. Thanks also to Colin Jones and Bunji Sawanoburri, with whom I spoke periodically
about this Article and whose suggestions helped immensely.
1. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 20 & art. 89 (Japan).
2. See infra Part II.
3. This refers to the Ehime Tamagushi case, Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, 51
SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1673 (Japan), and cases decided after that decision.
4. 66 SAIKOU SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHUU [MINSHU] no. 2 [1st Petty Bench] 2012,
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Part II of this Article addresses the cultural and legal norms that
governed Establishment of religion jurisprudence from the Meiji era
through the turn of the Twenty First Century, and from the Meiji
Constitution through Articles 20 and 89 of the current Japanese
Constitution. This part sets forth why there are three distinct eras in
the law. Part III looks more closely at the cases in the second and
third eras, those under the post-war (current) Japanese Constitution.
Part IV makes some observations on the current approach and will
be followed by a short conclusion. This Article suggests that the
current approach is a vast improvement over the pre-1997 approach,
but the current approach also has its limitations.
II. THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION
The Meiji Constitution was promulgated by Emperor Meiji in
1889 (on the Roman Calendar) and was in effect until the end of
5
World War II. The postwar Constitution was promulgated in
6
November 1946 and came into effect in 1947. Under the Meiji
Constitution there was no separation of church and state in any
7
modern sense. Article 3 of the Meiji Constitution read: “The
8
Emperor is sacred and inviolable.”
There was, however, a modicum of free exercise of religion under
9
the Meiji Constitution. Article 28 read: “Japanese subjects shall,
within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic
10
to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.” In
reality, this clause also included two qualifications that significantly
limited the free exercise of religion: 1) free exercise of religion is
available “within limits not prejudicial to peace and order,” and 2)
free exercise of religion is available so long as it is “not antagonistic
11
to [citizens’] duties as subjects.” Ultimately, what has come to be

[Herinafter Sunagawa City II] (This case sought the declaration of the illegality of municipal
property management of property containing a Shinto Shrine.).
5. DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPO [MEIJI KENPO] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan). An English
translation is available online at http://history.hanover.edu/texts/1889con.html.
6. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 20 & art. 89 (Japan).
7. DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPO [MEIJI KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], ch. 1, art. 3 (Japan).
8. Id.
9. Id. at ch. 2, art. 28.
10. Id.
11. Keiko Yamagishi, Freedom of Religion, Religious Political Participation, and Separation of
Religion and State: Legal Considerations from Japan, 2008 BYU L. REV. 919, 928.
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12

known as “State Shinto” was established as the state religion. State
Shinto involved worship, or public recognition of and fealty to, the
Emperor and the imperial ancestors who were said to have come
from an unbroken line descended from the Goddess Amaterasu, the
13
Goddess of the sun and universe in Shintoism.
It is important not to confuse State Shinto with the longstanding
tradition of Shintoism and modern Shinto. State Shinto was centered
on the Emperor and his ancestors, and included public rituals at the
imperial house and shrines to the emperor’s ancestors in every
14
home. The imperial household gave items to every household in
15
Japan every year from the imperial shrine at Ise. It was considered
to be the duty of every loyal Japanese subject to worship the imperial
16
ancestors at home. Needless to say, this could not coexist with the
serious free exercise of other religions. In fact, Buddhism, which had
sometimes been favored by the state in earlier periods of Japanese
17
18
history, became disfavored and State Shinto gained dominance.
19
State Shinto shrines were run by the government.
Traditional and modern Shinto, however, are quite different.
First, traditional Shinto and Buddhism coexisted well for at least one
20
thousand years. Second, traditional Shinto is heavily focused on
household ancestors and to some extent broader spirits and
21
animism. It is not that the imperial ancestors are irrelevant, but
rather that they are not the primary focus in many Shinto
22
traditions.
Eventually, State Shinto helped foster a militant mentality and a
23
greater sense of Japanese superiority.
This led to significant
military action and territorial occupation during the Meiji, Taisho,

12. Id. at 925–28.
13. NOBUSHIGE HOZUMI, ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND JAPANESE LAW (1912).
14. Id. at 30–31, 36–47.
15. Id. at 30.
16. Id. at 36.
17. KENJI MATSUO, A HISTORY OF JAPANESE BUDDHISM (2007).
18. HOZUME, supra note 13, at 91.
19. See generally id.
20. MATSUO, supra note 17.
21. C. SCOTT LITTLETON, UNDERSTANDING SHINTO: ORIGINS, BELIEFS, PRACTICES, FESTIVALS,
SPIRITS, SACRED PLACES (2011).
22. Id.
23. HELEN HARDACRE, SHINTO AND THE STATE, 1868–1988 (1991).
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24

and Showa eras. Ultimately, it led to Japan’s involvement in World
25
War II. After the war in 1945, the United States’ occupation
26
and in 1946 the
government officially abolished State Shinto,
27
modern Japanese Constitution was promulgated. Not surprisingly,
two major aspects of the new Constitution were: (1) the imposition
of significant limitations on imperial power and (2) the prohibition
of government establishment of, or support for, religion, under
28
Articles 20 and 89. The concepts imposed in this Constitution,
however, were modeled on the U.S. experience, and as Japan took its
place as one of the world’s leading constitutional democracies,
Japanese courts were faced with interpreting these constitutional
provisions in the context not of State Shinto, but of more traditional
forms of Shinto with origins going back Millennia before Emperor
29
Meiji came to power in the Nineteenth Century.
30
In a line of cases discussed in Part III, the Japanese Supreme
Court held that Shinto has a strong cultural component, and
therefore a certain level of public recognition. Even a subsidy of
Shinto was allowed without violating Articles 20 and 89 of the
31
Constitution. The government actions upheld in these cases were a
far cry from State Shinto, but these decisions seemed inconsistent
32
with the language of Articles 20 and 89. Also, as discussed in Part
33
III, the reasoning from these earlier cases was strongly rejected by
34
the Japanese Supreme Court in a landmark 1997 case. Since that
time, the Court has been grappling with its new approach. In two
cases decided in 2010 and in a follow up opinion to one of those
cases decided in 2012, the Court seems to have developed a more
forceful concept of Seiji to Shuukyou no Bunri, or separation of
church and state.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan).
28. Id. at art. 20 & art. 89.
29. LITTLETON, supra note 21.
30. See infra Part III.
31. Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi (Tsu City Ground-Breaking Ceremony Case), Saiko Saibansho
[Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977, 31 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 533, no. 69 (Japan).
32. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 20 & art. 89 (Japan).
33. See infra Part III.
34. The Ehime Tamagushi Case, Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, 51 SAIKO
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1673 (Japan).
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III. CASES UNDER THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION

This section discusses cases involving the establishment of
religion—the term for these issues under the United States
Constitution—under the postwar Japanese Constitution, specifically
Articles 20 and 89. Article 20 reads:
1) Freedom of Religion is Guaranteed to all. No religious
organization shall receive any privileges from the state, nor exercise
any political authority. 2) No person shall be compelled to take part
in any religious acts, celebration, right or practice. 3) The State and
its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other
35
religious activity.

Article 89 reads: “No public money or other property shall be
expended or appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of any
religious institution or association, or for any charitable, educational
or benevolent enterprises not under the control of public
36
authority.”
On their faces, these articles seem to provide a strong barrier
against government support for religion, especially financial and
educational support. In fact, as the Japanese Supreme Court held in
1997, such a conclusion is consistent with the language and intent of
these Articles, which were imposed on Japan but subsequently
accepted by the Japanese courts and government. Articles 20 and 89
are clearly aimed at ending state support for State Shinto or any
37
other religion. Yet until 1997, the Court did not view government
interaction with traditional Shinto as strictly subject to these
38
Subsection A discusses these cases. Subsection B
limitations.
focuses on the Japanese Supreme Court’s move away from these
earlier decisions and toward prohibiting government support for any
religion, including traditional Shintoism.

35. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 20 (Japan).
36. Id. at art. 89.
37. The Ehime Tamagushi Case, Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, 51 SAIKO
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1673 (Japan).
38. See infra Part III.A.
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A. Shinto as Culture (and Religion)
39

The Tsu City Groundbreaking Ceremony case, is the most famous
of what I will call “the Shinto as culture” cases, and it has been
40
followed in other cases. It is interesting because the Court adopted
a test very similar to the test adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
41
Lemon v. Kurtzman, but then held that Shinto can be interpreted as
a cultural practice, and therefore government recognition of Shinto
was not problematic under Article 20, paragraph 3 of the Japanese
42
Constitution.
The case also implicated Article 89 of the
43
Constitution.
In this case, Shinto rites were performed by a Shinto Priest at a
44
city-sponsored groundbreaking for a municipal gym. The city paid
45
for the ceremony and offerings. A local citizen brought a case
under the Japanese Constitution alleging that the ceremony was an
46
unconstitutional establishment of religion.
The trial court held that the ceremony was a folk custom and
47
thus not religion for constitutional purposes. The appellate court
reversed, holding that government support for the ceremony violated
48
the principle of separation of church and state. The Japanese
49
Supreme Court reversed. It held the State must be religiously
50
51
neutral, but not all state connection with religion is prohibited.

39. Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi (Tsu City Ground-Breaking Ceremony Case), Saiko Saibansho
[Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977, 31 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 533, no. 69 (Japan).
40. See infra notes 58.
41. 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (requiring courts to find government action
unconstitutional if it lacks a secular purpose, has a primary effect that advances or inhibits
religion, or fosters excessive government entanglement with religion).
42. Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi (Tsu City Ground-Breaking Ceremony Case), Saiko Saibansho
[Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977, 31 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 533, no. 69 (Japan).
43. See id. (The Court held that Article 89 was not violated because the money paid to the
Shinto priests to conduct the ceremony was a “fee for services,” and for that reason did not
violate Article 89). The Court’s reasoning in Tsu City would not likely be followed under the
post-1997 cases. See infra Part III.B.
44. Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi (Tsu City Ground-Breaking Ceremony Case), Saiko Saibansho
[Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977, 31 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 533, no. 69 (Japan).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.

510

DO NOT DELETE

505

1/29/2014 9:55 AM

The Shinto Cases

State connection with religion that, when considering Japanese social
and cultural conditions and the purpose and effect of the state
action, exceeds a reasonable standard consonant with the objective
52
of religious freedom, is unconstitutional. A violation of Article 20,
paragraph 3 occurs when government conduct has a purpose with
religious significance or the effect of the government conduct is to
53
subsidize, promote, suppress, or interfere with religion.
54
Here, the rites were obviously connected to religion, but they
were not unconstitutional when considering the totality of the
circumstances because the ceremony had the secular purpose of
“marking the start of construction by a rite performed in accordance
with general social custom to pray for a stable foundation for the
55
building and accident-free construction work.” The effects of the
ceremony did not subsidize or promote Shinto or suppress or
56
interfere with other religions, according to the Court. Therefore,
government support for—and involvement in—the ceremony was
57
not a religious activity for the purposes of Article 20.
Several subsequent cases followed the Tsu City case’s reasoning
and application of that reasoning. For example, the Court applied
Tsu City in a case involving a stone monument on a public school
58
playground. The local government subsidized the movement of the
monument, a high profile government official participated in
ceremonies held at the monument, and the association in charge of
59
the monument was not charged for the use of public property. The
60
memorial stone commemorated the war dead. The city transferred
and rebuilt a war monument on the school playground, which is
61
government property. It allowed a local association of The Japan
War-Bereaved Association to maintain the site and use the land free

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Saikou Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 21, 1999, Hei 7 (gyo-tsu) no. 148, 1696 HANREI
HIJOU [HANJI] 96 (Japan) (This case involved a claim for confirmation of invalidity of the
decision to cease using part of the playground and a claim for suspension of payment for the area
and memorial service).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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of charge. A Petty Bench of the Japanese Supreme Court upheld
63
the transfer, rebuilding, and free use by the association. Moreover,
the Court held that participation of the head of the local board of
education in Shinto or Buddhist rituals held at the site by the
64
association did not violate Article 20 or Article 89.
The Court applied reasoning very similar to that in the Tsu City
65
case. But the fact that the monument was a war memorial and that
the association was generally focused on the families of war dead are
important factual distinctions. Also, there is no evidence that the city
paid for the ceremonies in this case. Still, a high ranking local official
participated in the ceremonies and the monument sat on public land
66
free of charge. The Court held that the primary focus of the
monument and the association was the war dead, which was not
67
religious. Moreover, applying the test from the Tsu City case, the
Court held that a monument to the war dead is not related to any
specific religion and the city had a secular purpose for the land’s use
68
where the monument was located.
The Court further held, in a tone reflective of the Tsu City case,
that the head of the school board participated in the memorial
services “with the exclusive intention of conforming to common
69
courtesy for the bereaved families of the war dead.” Thus, the
Lemon style analysis was applied, but a government official’s
participation in religious ceremonies on government property was
upheld as being consistent with “common courtesy,” that is, as being
70
culturally appropriate. As explained in the next section, while the
current Japanese Supreme Court might agree with the first part of
this analysis if it could be shown that neither the monument or
association was religious in nature, the Court would be quite
unlikely to find the government official’s public participation in the
71
religious ceremonies on public property constitutional.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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B. Shinto as Religion (and Culture)

In 1997, the Japanese Supreme Court issued an opinion that
continued to follow and augmented the legal framework set forth in
the Tsu City case, but which drastically departed from that case’s
72
understanding of, and application of, that framework. The Ehime
Tamagushi case involved the use of public funds by government
73
officials from Ehime Prefecture. The funds were used for offerings
given by government officials to the Yasakuni Shrine and the
74
Gokoku Shrine at ceremonies held by those shrines.
The offerings cost relatively small sums of money and consisted
of twigs from a specific type of tree, the sakiki tree, wrapped with
75
folded white papers. This sort of offering to a Shinto Shrine is
76
called Tamagushi. The offerings were paid for with government
funds and given by representatives of the government at the behest
77
of Haruki Shiraishi, the then governor of Ehime Prefecture.
The Court in Ehime Tamagushi applied the legal test from the Tsu
78
City case, but it also added an endorsement of religion analysis
79
similar to that used by the U.S. Supreme Court. Significantly, the
Court explicitly condemned Meiji era Free Exercise practices and
held that, “the Constitution should be interpreted as striving for a
secular and religiously neutral state by regarding the total separation
80
The Court held that this
of state and religion as its ideal.”
81
approach helps protect the freedom of religion. This is a stark
contrast from the analysis in the Tsu City case, because the Court
suggested total separation of religion and government if the ideal
and did not give much weight to the cultural and political history of
82
officials visiting these shrines.

72. The Ehime Tamagushi Case, Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, 51 SAIKO
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1673 (Japan).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. HOZUMI, supra note 13, at 59.
77. The Ehime Tamagushi Case, Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, 51 SAIKO
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1673 (Japan).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Compare Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi (Tsu City Ground-Breaking Ceremony Case), Saiko
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The Court recognized, however, that total separation between
church and state is impossible, because anytime government
83
regulates social norms it can affect religion indirectly. The test to
determine whether religious neutrality is violated is the purpose and
84
effects test used in the Tsu City case, but with an endorsement
gloss: i.e., considering whether the government action under review
85
favors religion in the eyes of the public. The Court applied this
analysis to cases under both Article 20 and Article 89, and found
that paying for and giving the offerings violated both the purpose
86
and effect elements of the test and endorsed religion.
Applying that test, the Court held that the offering of tamagushi
(and kumoturyo, another kind of offering made to the Shrines), in
the name of the local government, directly supports the religious
87
activity of the shrine. The Court noted that other sorts of gifts,
such as koden, which is a gift to the family of the war dead, could be
given on behalf of the government because it is not given to the
88
shrine or in support of religious activity. The Court also noted that
89
government officials may give saisen from their own pockets.
Saisen is an anonymous gift given when people visit temples or
90
shrines.
The Court ordered Shiraishi to repay the government for all the
expenditures made in support of the offerings because he had
ordered the other defendants to make the offerings by invoking his
91
power under relevant municipal laws. The enforcement of the
holding through a judgment is quite significant. For a variety of
reasons, well beyond the scope of this Article, the Japanese Supreme
Court has sometimes found Constitutional violations but been
relatively lax in enforcement. Thus, an order requiring Shiraishi to

Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977, 31 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 533, no. 69
(Japan), with The Ehime Tamagushi Case, Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, 51 SAIKO
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1673 (Japan).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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repay all the costs to the government out of his own pocket is a
rather significant action by the Court.
Recently, in two Grand Bench opinions and a Petty Bench
opinion that addressed enforcement of one of the Grand Bench
opinions, the Court followed and further elaborated on the analysis
92
from the Ehime Tamagushi case. The results differed in the two
93
Grand Bench cases, but the factual distinctions are significant. The
factual distinctions were especially important because the same local
94
government in Hokkaido was involved in both cases.
In Sunagawa City I, the city had allowed a joint neighborhood
association the use of city owned property, located in and near a
City-owned meeting hall, for a Shinto Shrine without requesting any
95
compensation from the association. The shrine consisted of a torii
(gate to a Shinto Shrine), a jishingu (stone monument to the deity
that is seen as protecting the local area), a hokora (small Shinto
Shrine), and a sign noting that Shinto Shrine is located in the
96
building. A religious association called the Ujiko managed the
property and performed festivals and rituals but paid no
97
compensation to the city for the use of the property.
The Court using the endorsement analysis from Ehime
Tamagushi—how this situation would be viewed from the public’s
perspective—held that the city’s actions violated Article 20 and
98
Article 89. The fact that the Shrine was originally taken on by the
city at the request of a local citizen who had donated the land (for
99
tax reasons) did not change this analysis. The Court acknowledged
the religious nature of a Shinto Shrine and the problems relating to
92. 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1 [Grand Bench 2010],
[hereinafter Sunagawa City I]; 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1 (gyo-tsu no.
334) [Grand Bench 2010] (hereinafter Sunagawa City Failure to Administer Property Case);
Sunagawa City II, 66 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 2 [1st Petty Bench 2012].
93. Compare Sunagawa City I, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1
[Grand Bench 2010], and Sunagawa City Failure to Administer Property Case, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1 (gyo-tsu No. 334) [Grand Bench 2010].
94. Compare Sunagawa City I, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1, and
Sunagawa City Failure to Administer Property Case, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU]
no. 1 (gyo-tsu No. 334).
95. Sunagawa City I, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1 [Grand Bench
2010].
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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The use of a
government favoritism toward the Shrine.
government meeting building to house a religious Shrine, especially
without any compensation, would be viewed from the public’s
101
perspective as favoring religion—in this case, Shintoism.
The Court noted, however, that it would be inappropriate to
require the Mayor to remove the Shrine immediately because it
would make it very hard for the Ujiko group to carry out its religious
activities, which would harm the religious freedom of members of
102
the group.
Thus, the Court remanded the case to see whether any
“rational and realistic alternative means” other than total removal of
103
the shrine were possible.
The Court noted several possible
alternatives, including a grant, transfer for compensation, or lease at
104
It is unclear if a grant by itself would have been
fair market value.
constitutional under these facts; but in a related case, decided in
2010 and discussed next, a grant was allowed under somewhat
105
different facts.
The Sunagawa City I court seemed to favor a
remedy that involved compensation or a lease at fair market value;
but since it also mentioned a grant, it is not clear what would be
106
required.
The Court ultimately approved, in Sunagawa City II—
discussed below, a lease at fair market value and some other
107
measures.
In another decision involving a different Shrine in Sunagawa City
concerning facts somewhat distinguishable from Sunagawa City I, the
Court upheld a transfer by the local government to a neighborhood
association of a Shinto Shrine and the small parcel of land on which
108
it sat.
To avoid confusion, I will refer to this case as the Sunagawa
109
The transfer of the land and
Failure to Administer Property Case.
shrine was challenged under Article 20, paragraph 3 and under

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sunagawa City Failure to Administer Property Case, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI

HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1 (gyo-tsu No. 334) [Grand Bench 2010].
106. Sunagawa City I, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1 [Grand Bench
2010].
107. Id.
108. Sunagawa City Failure to Administer Property Case, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1 (gyo-tsu No. 334) [Grand Bench 2010].
109. Id.
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110

Interestingly, the Court noted that given the religious
Article 89.
nature of a Shinto Shrine, the city might have been viewed—from
111
the public’s point of view—to be favoring religion.
The case has some interesting similarities to the recent U.S.
112
Supreme Court decision in Salazar v. Buono,
which involved a
large cross in the middle of the desert that was originally on
government land but was transferred to a private organization after it
113
was found unconstitutional by a lower court.
The transfer was
114
challenged, and the case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Significantly, though, in Salazar, land and cash were given to the
115
government by the private entity.
That land and cash were
designed to equal the value of the land, given by the government, on
116
which the cross sat.
In the Sunagawa Failure to Administer Property case, however,
which was decided before Salazar, compensation was not paid to the
117
city.
The Court noted, however, that the land had originally
belonged to the predecessor of the same neighborhood association
and the purpose for which it was given to the city (teacher’s
apartments) was no longer being served because those apartments
118
were no longer there.
There was no such history in the Salazar
case, and in fact, Congress’s actions in that case were far more
suspicious from an Establishment Clause perspective than were the
actions of Sunagawa City in this case.
The Sunagawa City land transfer was viewed by the Court as a
return of land given by the association to the city for a specific
119
purpose that was no longer being served.
The land transfer was a
constitutional way to avoid problems under Article 20 and Article 89
that would have existed had the city continued to allow the shrine

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
559 U.S. 700 (2010).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sunagawa City Failure to Administer Property Case, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI

HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1 (gyo-tsu No. 334) [Grand Bench 2010].
118. Id.
119. Id.
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120

Thus, the facts of the case differ in an
on its land free of charge.
121
important way from the facts in Sunagwa City I.
A Petty Bench of the Japanese Supreme Court decided a follow
122
I will refer to the
up case to the Sunagawa City I case in 2012.
2012 case as Sunagawa City II. As explained above, the case involved
a Shinto Shrine on local government property in Sunagawa City in
Hokkaido. The land was originally private, but was donated to the
123
city by the landowner for tax reasons.
The Supreme Court found
violations of Article 20, paragraph 1 and Article 89, in Sunagawa City
124
but remanded the case to see whether any “rational and realistic
I
alternative means” other than total removal of the shrine were
125
This case was decided based on the City’s actions after
possible.
126
remand.
After the decision in Sunagawa City I, the city and the Shinto
group agreed to have the shrine materials removed from the public
building and relocated near the Tori at the group’s expense, which
would make the shrine much smaller in area and allow the group to
127
The Court
rent that land from the city at a reasonable cost.
128
upheld this arrangement.
Three factors seemed relevant to the
holding. First, the shrine was there before the land was public, and a
private entity would now be paying fair rent for its space and would
no longer be occupying a public building. Second, the purpose and
effect of the arrangement did not unconstitutionally favor
129
religion.
Third, there was no “endorsement” of religion under
these circumstances because a member of the public would not
130
believe this arrangement promoted Shintoism.
Thus, the Court
followed up on its earlier judgment with serious analysis of whether
the post-remand arrangement was itself constitutional.

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Sunagawa City II, 66 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 2 [1st Petty
Bench 2012].
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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IV. BENEFITS OF THE CURRENT APPROACH

The current approach to Article 20, paragraphs 1 and 3, and
Article 89, is a vast improvement over the pre-1997 approach for
several reasons. First, the Ehime Tamagushi Court addressed the
historical reasons for its decision going back to the problems created
131
by State Shinto during the Meiji, Taisho, and early Showa eras.
Second, the Court addressed the principles that underlay its legal
132
Third,
analysis in much clearer terms than did the Tsu City Court.
the approach in Ehime Tamagushi and its progeny is far more
consistent with the actual language of Articles 20 and 89 than were
133
Finally, the post-1997
the decisions in Tsu City and its progeny.
approach not only states the Constitutional principles and legal tests
it is applying, but also takes the enforcement of judgments seriously.
Technically, the idea of binding precedent is not required in
134
Japanese law.
But both the Tsu City and Ehime Tamagushi cases
were followed by subsequent Courts (and lower courts). Perhaps
most significantly, the Ehime Tamagushi Court’s rejection of the Tsu
135
City Court’s reasoning has been followed by subsequent Courts.
Still, none of the decisions subsequent to Ehime Tamagushi have
been as explicit in their reasoning as that landmark case was. In fact,
it can be argued that the Sunagawa City I Court’s order on remand,
that the city should use any “rational and realistic alternative means”
other than total removal of the shrine if possible, was a way to avoid
136
enforcement of its judgement.
However, the subsequent action by
the City after that case and discussion of that action by the Court in
Sunagawa City II, suggest that the Court continues to take the
reasoning in Ehime Tamagushi seriously.
VI. CONCLUSION
Rather than viewing the Japanese Supreme Court’s Shinto cases
as a single line of cases, this Article suggests that the cases fall into

131. The Ehime Tamagushi Case, 51 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1673.
132. Id.
133. Id.; NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 20 & art. 89 (Japan).
134. Shigenori Matsui, Constitutional Precedents in Japan: A Comment on the Role of Precedent,
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1669 (2011).
135. See supra Part III.B.
136. Sunagawa City I, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1 [Grand Bench
2010].
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two lines. Both of these lines of cases use related legal tests, but the
application of the legal tests, as well as the guiding principles and
historical analysis underlying that application, suggest two distinct
periods in Japanese Supreme Court postwar establishment of
religion cases. Those cases decided before 1997, and those cases
137
decided after the landmark 1997 decision in Ehime Tamagushi.
Therefore, this Article suggests that the cases from 1997 until the
present are far more consistent with the language and history of
Articles 20 and 89 of the Japanese Constitution.

137. The Ehime Tamagushi Case, 51 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1673.
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